The Nuclear Disconnect

How National Climate Plans Lost Touch with Reality

In 2015, world leaders created the Paris Agreement to coordinate global climate action, requiring nations to submit detailed climate strategies to the United Nations. These take two forms: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), updated every five years to outline medium-term goals, and Long-term Low Emission Development Strategies (LTS), which chart the path to carbon neutrality.

Today, there's a striking disparity between what nations say in these documents and what they actually do. The gap is particularly glaring in the nuclear energy sector, where official climate commitments have failed to keep pace with rapidly evolving policy and energy realities.

The Great Nuclear Pivot

The 2023 global stocktake at COP28 marked a historic shift, formally recognizing nuclear energy as a decarbonization tool for the first time. During the conference, twenty-five nations made a landmark commitment to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050. This dramatic evolution in nuclear policy stands in stark contrast to most countries' official climate plans, which were written in an era of greater nuclear skepticism.

This seismic shift in energy policy is barely reflected in these nations' NDCs and LTS documents—creating a credibility gap that threatens to undermine the very framework designed to coordinate global climate action. The timing is particularly critical: the next round of NDC submissions is due in 2025, offering a crucial opportunity to align official commitments with current nuclear ambitions.

The Paper Trail Goes Cold

The disconnect is particularly glaring among Triple Nuclear Pledge signatories:

• France's Long-Term Strategy, submitted in 2020, still targets a reduction of nuclear power down to 50% by 2035—a policy that has since been completely reversed with plans for massive nuclear expansion of up to 14 new reactors.

• The Netherlands, once committed to a nuclear phase-out in its climate documents, now plans to build two new reactors, acknowledging that excluding nuclear energy would make its 95% emission reduction target virtually impossible.

• Japan's NDC maintains cautious post-Fukushima language about nuclear power, while the country actively works to restore nuclear to 20-22% of its electricity mix by 2030. It has already taken concrete steps, recently restarting the Onagawa Nuclear Plant in service of this goal.

• The United States' NDC primarily discusses "leveraging existing nuclear facilities" while remaining conspicuously silent on new construction. This understated language belies a dramatic reemergence of nuclear in recent years: the completion of Vogtle Units 3 and 4, The Inflation Reduction Act and ADVANCE Act making nuclear more affordable and deployable, planned revivals of shuttered plants like Three Mile Island and Palisades, and innovative projects like TerraPower's Natrium reactor.

• South Korea's NDC makes no mention of nuclear power whatsoever, despite the country's proven success in exporting its APR1400 technology to the UAE and a dramatic reversal of its phase-out policy to instead maintain nuclear's 30% share of electricity generation.

• Sweden, another pledge signatory, has abandoned its "100% renewable" target in favor of "fossil-free" electricity to accommodate nuclear expansion. Still, its LTS tip-toes around nuclear energy's future role.

Eastern Europe's Nuclear Commitment

Among Triple Nuclear Pledge signatories, Eastern European nations show particularly stark contrasts between ambition and documentation:

• Czech Republic's climate documents barely hint at the country's plans to significantly increase its nuclear production beyond the current one-third share of electricity generation.

• Hungary's LTS acknowledges nuclear power as necessary for climate neutrality but downplays its ambitious expansion plans, including new reactors currently under construction.

• Slovakia, which gets half its power from nuclear sources, mentions new reactors only in passing within its strategy documents, despite broad public and political support for nuclear expansion.

• Slovenia shares a reactor with Croatia that meets nearly a quarter of its energy needs, yet its climate strategy only vaguely references plans for 2400 megawatts of new nuclear capacity to come online in the 2030s.

• Ukraine, despite war-related challenges, maintains nuclear power as central to its energy security and plans four new reactors at Khmelnytskyi to offset lost capacity at Zaporizhzhia, yet its climate documents need updating to reflect both current realities and future ambitions.

Major Nuclear Powers Outside the Pledge

The misalignment between official climate plans and nuclear reality extends beyond pledge signatories:

• China plans to build 150 new reactors before 2040—more than the rest of the world has built in the past 35 years. Yet its NDC merely mentions nuclear power as part of a "clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient energy system" without acknowledging the unprecedented scale of its nuclear expansion.

• India's NDC discusses nuclear power more directly, mentioning plans to build an impressive 63 GW of installed capacity by 2032. However, it frames this massive expansion—nearly eleven times its current capacity—almost as an afterthought in its broader energy strategy.

• Russia emphasizes its role as a nuclear technology exporter in its climate documents while understating its domestic expansion plans.

Emerging Nuclear Nations and Transitions

The disconnect extends to countries at various stages of nuclear development:

• The United Arab Emirates, pledge signatory and pioneer of nuclear power in the Arab world, has already achieved 25% nuclear electricity generation through its Barakah plant, with plans for more reactors barely mentioned in its climate documents.

• Oman, perhaps inspired by their nuclear neighbors in the UAE, now mentions the technology as an option in its climate strategy. The country imagines a modest contribution of 7.8 TWh of nuclear electricity annually by 2050.

• Turkey's first nuclear plant, Akkuyu, will meet 10% of the country's electricity needs by 2028, yet its NDC only briefly mentions a 4.8 GW capacity goal by 2030.

• Belgium has delayed its phase-out plans until 2035, extending reactor lifespans while its LTS remains largely silent on nuclear's role.

• Spain, while debating its currently planned nuclear phase-out, operates seven reactors providing 20% of its electricity, yet its LTS focuses almost exclusively on renewable energy.

• Armenia, a pledge signatory operating a single reactor providing 28% of its electricity, plans new nuclear units while maintaining modest language in its climate documents.

• Switzerland operates five reactors providing 25% of its electricity, and while its NDC still reflects a phase-out policy from 2011, growing nuclear support may lead to a policy reversal as soon as 2025.

• Argentina actively pursues nuclear innovation with its CAREM25 SMR prototype, yet its NDC only briefly mentions "developing nuclear energy."

Time for an Update

The recent global stocktake at COP28 formally recognized nuclear energy as a decarbonization tool for the first time. The next round of NDC submissions, due in 2025, offers a crucial opportunity to bridge this credibility gap. Countries need to align their official climate commitments with their actual nuclear policies to maintain the integrity of international climate frameworks.

Looking Ahead

As the world grapples with the dual challenges of energy security and climate change, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial tool in many nations' arsenals. The disparity between official climate plans and actual nuclear policies must be addressed to maintain the integrity of international climate frameworks and provide a clear picture of how nations plan to achieve their climate goals.

The next round of climate commitments cannot afford to perpetuate this nuclear disconnect. The credibility of the entire Paris Agreement framework depends on it.

Note: The full list of signatories to the Triple Nuclear Pledge includes The United States, Canada, Finland, France, Ghana, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Netherlands, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

For an expanded overview and analysis of the existing NDCs and LTS for the twenty-six countries that mention nuclear in some way, click here.